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INTRODUCTION
Children are perhaps America’s most precious, yet
vulnerable members of society. Their innocence and naivety
leave many susceptible to pedophiles, who wish to exploit
children for their own perversions. As a result, Congress
enacted strict laws to shield children from sexual exploitation
and to prosecute those responsible for such atrocities. In
Miller v. California, the Supreme Court held that
pornography depicting children “may be proscribed regardless
of whether the images ‘taken as a whole’ appeal to ‘prurient
interests’ or ‘have serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.’”1 Despite the Court’s ruling in Miller in
1973, Congress failed to enact a federal statute prohibiting
the use of children in the production of sexually explicit
materials until 1977.2 Recognizing that children were being
exploited for pornography and suffering harm, Congress
enacted the Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq., in May
of 1977.3
Despite this Act, child pornography remains
pervasive throughout the United States. In fact, child
pornography is currently a billion dollar industry.4
Congress’s failure to eradicate child pornography can be
attributed in part to the inconsistent applications of child
pornography laws, including § 2251. Under § 2251, any
person who employs or entices a minor to engage in sexually
explicit conduct for the depiction of such conduct is in
violation of the law.5 Under § 2256, the term sexually explicit
is defined as the “lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
1. James E. Bristol, Free Expression in Motion Pictures: Childhood Sexuality and
a Satisfied Society, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 333, 352-53 (2007) (citing Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
2. Id. at 342; see S. Rep. 95-438 at 1. Act became law under Pub. L. No. 95-225
(1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§2251-2252, 2256 (2006)).
3. See Bristol, supra note 1, at 342; 18 U.S.C. § 2251.
4. Allison L. Cochran, Punishment for Virtual Child Pornography. . .It’s Just A
Fantasy, 2 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished comment, on file with BePress), available at
http://works.bepress.com/allison_cochran.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2012).
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area of any person.”6 Today, several circuits use a nonexhaustive, common law, totality of the circumstances test
known as the “Dost Factor Test” to identify lasciviousness,
and thus, sexual explicitness.7 However, United States v.
Johnson exposes the problems that can result in applying
Congress’s child pornography standards and the Dost Factor
Test.8
In Johnson, a weightlifting coach filmed his minor
weightlifters in the nude.9 Both the district court and circuit
court applied the Dost Factor Test to determine the presence
of lasciviousness in the videos.10 Focusing on the content of
each video, Judge Richard E. Dorr of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri held that
the videos of each minor depicted mere nudity, not
lasciviousness or sexual explicitness.11 Thus, the district
court acquitted Scott A. Johnson of charges of sexual
exploitation of children in violation of § 2251.12 However, the
United States appealed the district court’s decision, and a
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, finding Mr.
Johnson guilty of violating § 2251 by filming child
pornography.13 The Eighth Circuit, in an opinion written by
Judge David R. Hansen, held that the district court erred by
focusing on whether the videotapes themselves were actually
lascivious; Mr. Johnson’s intent and the context in which the
images were created were sufficient to violate § 2251.14
Despite its implementation across a number of circuit
courts, the Dost Factor Test applying § 2251 uses ambiguous
language, forcing jurors to engage in the disturbing process of
analyzing potentially pornographic material, and it results in
inconsistent applications that focus on either the content or
the intent behind such images. First, the term lascivious,
which is used to define child pornography under § 2251,
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (2012).
7. United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
8. See generally United States v. Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D. Mo. 2010),
rev’d, 639 F.3d 433, 438 (8th Cir. 2011).
9.
See Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1091.
10. See id. at 1096; Johnson, 639 F.3d at 439.
11. See Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1096.
12. See id. at 1089.
13. See Johnson, 639 F.3d at 438.
14. See id. at 438-39.
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problematically varies in meaning among the different
circuits.15 Factors that are regularly applied with the Dost
Factor Test, such as “sexually suggestive” and “sexual
coyness,” are vague and often reshaped based on the differing
experiences of individual jury members.16 Second, society’s
commercialization of a child’s sexuality renders it nearly
impossible for jurors to properly apply the fact-sensitive Dost
Factor Test and to discern lawful images of children from
pornography.17 Professors Amy Adler and Robert J. Danay
even assert that the Dost Factor Test’s requirement for courts
and jurors to scrutinize images of naked children contributes
to society’s sexual exploitation of children.18 Third, several
federal court decisions have skewed the application of the
Dost Factor Test by applying either only content-based or
intent-based factors to their analysis. Robert J. Danay
explains that Dost Factor Test decisions focusing solely upon
the content of images fail to reach images that may seem
fairly innocuous, yet were created by a pedophile with
perverse intentions.19 On the other hand, a Dost Factor Test
15. One authority summarizes some of the problems:
[U]nder Ferber lascivious describes the child’s conduct, not necessarily the
child. On the other hand, Knox held that lascivious describes depictions
“presented by the photographer . . . to arouse or satisfy the sexual cravings of
a voyeur.” Under this interpretation, lascivious describes the viewer. In
United States v. Wiegand, the Ninth Circuit held that lascivious should be
interpreted from the perspective of the “audience that consists of [the
filmmaker] or likeminded pedophiles.” So lascivious describes not only the
viewer (including pedophiles), but also the filmmaker. But how does one
interpret lascivious from the perspective of the pedophile? Interpretation of
what lascivious describes harkens back to Justice Stewart’s explanation of
obscenity: I know it when I see it.
See Bristol, supra note 1, at 353-54:
16. Id. at 355.
17. See id. at 364 (citing ANNE HIGONNET, PICTURES OF INNOCENCE: THE HISTORY
AND CRISIS OF IDEAL CHILDHOOD 133, 153 (1998)).
18. Robert J. Danay, The Danger of Fighting Monsters: Addressing the Hidden
Harms of Child Pornography Law 11 REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES 151, 156
(2005); Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Childhood Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
209, 210 (2001) [hereinafter Adler, The Perverse Law].
19. As Danay states:
In an effort to condemn all materials that might hold some special inciting
effect upon alleged pedophiles, the judicial pedophilic gaze is extending to
materials that are increasingly mundane. This trend is all the more
distressing given the evidence of certain professed pedophiles who claim to
prefer more innocent representations of children. For these people, it may be
the very ‘sexual naïvete’ of the depicted children that is arousing . . . . If this is
so, the judicial search for pedophilic material threatens to publicly sexualize
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analysis centering exclusively upon the creator’s intent could
qualify virtually any image of a child as pornography.20
To resolve these issues, triers of fact should be required to
balance both content-based and intent-based factors during a
Dost Factor Test analysis. This requirement would guard
against triers of fact applying only those factors that support
their personal opinions toward the defendant in the case
before them. Also, this heightened standard offers a greater
level of assurance that an image was properly found
lascivious. Moreover, this standard will remain organic,
allowing the definition of the term lascivious to reshape as
society’s standards change. Finally, this new requirement will
allow courts to refine concepts as to what images constitute
lasciviousness and what images do not.
This comment will first explain the meaning and
application of § 2251, the Dost Factor Test, and the different
holdings of the district court and court of appeals in United
States v. Johnson. The following section will explore the
criticisms that plague the Dost Factor Test, including its
vagueness, misapplication, and its unintended promotion of
the sexualization of children. Finally, this comment offers a
solution that will allow judges and juries to apply the Dost
Factor Test effectively by requiring a balance of both contentbased and intent-based factors during the test’s
implementation.
I. DECIPHERING 18 U.S.C. § 2251, THE DOST FACTOR TEST AND
UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON
A. § 18 U.S.C. 2251 and the Dost Factor Test
Congress’s concern with the growth of commercial child
pornography led it to enact 18 U.S.C. § 2251 in 1977.21 Since
that time, the Act has been amended several times to
strengthen its protection over America’s children.22 In 1984,
1986, and most recently in 1988, Congress expanded the
statute’s reach by raising the age of those defined as minors,
all images of children no matter how innocuous the context.
Danay, supra note 18, at 156-57.
20. See Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 956
(2001) [hereinafter Adler, Inverting the First Amendment,].
21. See Bristol, supra note 1, at 342.
22. See Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 956.
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extending provisions to reach offenders who print and publish
child pornography, and increasing the penalties for
conviction.23 Under the current § 2251, “[a]ny person who
employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any
minor to engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the
purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct
shall be punished as provided under subsection (e).”24 Under
§ 2256, sexually explicit conduct is defined as: sexual
intercourse; bestiality; masturbation; sadistic or masochistic
abuse; or lascivious exhibition of the genital or pubic area of a
person. 25
Focusing on this final category, while neither § 2251 nor §
2256 explicitly define lascivious, the Third, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits have each adopted a holistic test to assess whether
material involving a child is lascivious, and, thus, sexually
explicit under § 2251.26 The applicable test originated in the
Southern District of California case United States v. Dost.27
Under this test, “[c]ourts consider a non-exhaustive list of
factors in determining whether a depiction meets the category
of ‘lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.’”28
Factors considered may include:
(1) whether the focal point is on the minor’s genitals or pubic area;
(2) whether the picture’s setting is sexually suggestive, i.e. in a
place associated with sexual activity; (3) whether considering the
minor’s age, the minor is depicted in an unnatural pose or in
inappropriate attire; (4) whether the minor is partially clothed or
nude; (5) whether the picture suggests sexual coyness or a
willingness to engage in sexual activity and; (6) whether the
picture is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response from the
viewer.29

23. Id.
24. United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 438 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256 (2012)).
25. § 2256.
26. See United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986). For
applications of the Dost Factor Test see United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir.
1989); United States v. Wallenfang, 568 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2009); Shoemaker v. Taylor,
730 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2013).
27. See generally Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 828.
28. United States v. Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1094 (W.D. Mo. 2010) (citing
Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 828).
29. Id. (citing Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 828). Because the Dost Factor Test’s list of
applicable criteria is non-exhaustive, the district court in Johnson added the additional
factor of whether the picture depicts the minor as a sexual object.
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The decision is based on a totality of the circumstances,
and not all of these factors need be present to find a
“lascivious exhibition of the genital or pubic area.” 30
Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit has held that “[i]mages or
exhibitions of female breasts and the buttocks of either
gender are not within the purview of § 2251(a),” and therefore
not lascivious. 31
B. Applying the Dost Factor Test to United States v. Johnson
1. Johnson the Coach or Johnson the Pedophile?
While the Dost Factor Test serves to define lascivious
under § 2251, its application in both the district and circuit
court decisions in United States v. Johnson highlights its
severe deficiencies and reveals its need for restructuring.
Mr. Johnson served as a weightlifting coach at a
specialized facility for young athletes located in Springfield,
Missouri.32
He had been involved in weightlifting
competitions as both a participant and as a coach.33 In fact,
he served as a women’s weightlifting coach at the 2004
Olympic Games and refereed national weightlifting
competitions.34
In the sport of weightlifting, participants compete in
classes based upon their body weight.35 Weightlifting coaches
record a lifter’s weight through frequent weigh-ins in
preparation for competitive events.36 Prior to a competition,
each participant stands on a scale and “weighs in” in either
the nude or underwear. 37 A referee of the same gender
conducts the weigh-in.38 On several occasions, Johnson
30. Steven L. Grasz, Child Pornography and Child Nudity: Why and How States
May Constitutionally Regulate the Production, Possession, and Distribution, of Nude
Visual Depictions of Children, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 609, 622 (1998) (quoting Dost, 636 F.
Supp. at 832).
31. United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 438 (8th Cir. 2011); see also United
States v. Gleich, 397 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]aking pictures of a non-pubic area
such as the buttocks does not meet the definition of “sexually explicit conduct.”).
32. Johnson, 639 F.3d at 435.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 435-36.
35. Id. at 436.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Johnson, 639 F.3d at 436.
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instructed female athletes to enter an examination room,
disrobe completely, and weigh themselves.39 The females
were unaware that Johnson had set up a hidden video camera
to film their weigh-ins.40 Johnson had placed the camera
between two shelves, limiting its vertical view, yet preventing
its discovery. 41 At least two female athletes were minors at
the time Johnson filmed them.42 When authorities found the
videotapes in Johnson’s home, he confessed to investigators
that he filmed the girls without their knowledge, because he,
“just wanted to film them . . . [and] see them naked.”43 A
grand jury indicted Johnson on ten counts of sexual
exploitation of a minor under § 2251.44
2. The Videotapes
At trial, the jury assessed eight videos filmed by Mr.
Johnson, each video representing an alleged violation of
§ 2251.45 The first count stated, “[t]he scale faces the table,
such that when a person stands on it, a side view is captured.
The minor enters the room, undresses completely, weighs
herself, and redresses.”46 While this view shielded the minor’s
pubic region, the video showed the minor from just below her
shoulders to her calves.47 Under the second count, “[t]he scale
faces the table. The minor disrobes outside of the camera’s
view. The minor weighs herself naked, giving the camera a
side view from just above her breasts to her calves.” 48
However, the video did not clearly show the minor’s pubic
area and captured no frontal nudity.49 Under the third count,
“[t]he scale faces the wall opposite the camera, such that the
camera captures a rear view of the person standing on the
scale. The camera’s zoom appears to be increased.” 50 While
the minor weighed herself naked and the frame showed from
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

United States v. Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1091 (W.D. Mo. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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her left buttocks to just below her knee, the image captured
no frontal view.51 Under the fourth count, even though the
victim was completely naked at the time, only a side view was
visible.52 Under the fifth count, not only did Johnson face the
scale toward the table, but he also enhanced the camera’s
zoom to a similar degree as the video in the fourth count. 53
The video showed a female wearing red workout shorts, and
therefore no frontal nudity.54 Under the sixth count, the
frame showed the scale facing the table.55 While the minor redressed mostly outside of the camera’s view, the frame
showed the nude minor from just above her breasts to her
calves. 56 In addition, the far left side of the frame briefly
showed the minor’s pubic region.57 Under the seventh count,
the frame showed a side view of the minor from her upper
back to her calves.58 Under the eighth count, the scale
directly faced the camera.59 The minor weighed herself three
separate times: once fully clothed, once only wearing
underwear and a bra, and once only wearing underwear.60
The video showed the minor from her shoulders to her
calves.61
Two of the victims testified that they were between the
ages of fifteen and seventeen at the time Johnson filmed
counts one, three, four, five, and eight.62 However, there was
no evidence that Johnson tried to enhance the videos by
freeze framing any of the images.63 On December 16, 2009,
after analyzing the videos using the Dost Factor Test, the jury
returned a guilty verdict on all eight counts of attempted
sexual exploitation of a minor under § 2251(a) and (e).64
Johnson’s sentence would carry a minimum of fifteen years in

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
Id. at 1093.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1096.
Id. at 1093.
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prison.65 However, Judge Dorr granted Mr. Johnson’s motion
for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict and found that he
had not violated § 2251 under any of the counts.66
3. The Western District Court of Missouri’s Refusal to
Look Beyond the Four Corners of the Image
In providing his analysis using the Dost Factor Test,
Judge Dorr disregarded Mr. Johnson’s sexual intentions and
chose to focus solely on the content of each video. The Judge
held that “[a]though this Court believes Mr. Johnson’s
conduct should not go unpunished, the Court finds § 2251(a)
was not intended to apply to Mr. Johnson’s conduct,” which
consisted only of mere nudity.67 Judge Dorr emphasized that
the crime charged against Mr. Johnson is limited specifically
to a video depiction of a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area. . .”68 He also turned to the American Heritage
Dictionary, which defines the term lascivious as “of or
characterized by lust, lewd, [or] lecherous.”69 Relying upon
this definition, Judge Dorr opined that mere nudity could in
no way be considered a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area.”70
To distinguish lasciviousness from mere nudity, the
district court first looked to United States v. Rivera.71 There,
the Second Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find
images showing a minor female lying naked with her legs
spread and the camera focusing on her pubic area are
unquestionably lascivious, because they serve to elicit a
sexual response in the viewer.72 The district court also cited
United States v. Horn, where the court held that freezeframing portions of videotape to expose the pubic areas of
young girls indicates lascivious conduct under the Dost Factor
Test.73 Distinguishing these cases from the facts at hand,
Judge Dorr opined that the content of the videos taken by
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1091.
See generally id.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1093 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2) (2012)).
Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
Id.
See United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2008).
Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (citing Rivera, 546 F.3d at 250).
Id. at 1096 (citing United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 789 (8th Cir. 1999)).
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Johnson constituted mere nudity.74 In his reasoning, Judge
Dorr stated, “[t]here was no evidence in this case of freeze
framing nor was there evidence that zoom enhancement made
the minors’ genitals or pubic area the focus of the depiction.”75
Johnson did not alter the camera’s zoom, placement, or scale
to make the minors’ pubic areas the focal point of the video.76
In addition, Judge Dorr remained unconvinced that a video
showing a nude female from her lower back to just below her
knees was intended to target a minor’s pubic area.77 Finally,
Judge Dorr highlighted the fact that Johnson never told the
two girls to pose in a certain way or to wear certain
suggestive clothing during weigh-ins.78
Secondly, the district court determined that the videos
were not made with a sexual intent.
These videos
indisputably depicted two minors “taking off their clothes,
stepping onto a scale, getting off the scale, dressing, and
leaving the room.”79 But, because these two minors were
filmed engaging only in the non-sexual acts requested by
Johnson, they were not portrayed with the intent of being
sexual objects, as when pictures of children are uploaded onto
a website devoted to sexual images. 80 Therefore, the videos
were not intended to elicit a sexual response in viewers any
more than mere nudity would elicit.81 Furthermore, Judge
Dorr extended the scope of his opinion, asserting that
“[r]egardless of all the Government argument about Mr.
Johnson’s intent and what he attempted to gain, it is clear
from the end product – the videos – that he failed to actually
produce a visual depiction of a ‘lascivious exhibition of the
[minors’] genitals or pubic area.”82
Finally, the district court explained that the actions of Mr.
Johnson did not violate § 2251 because the minors did not
suffer any damage. Judge Dorr held that “[t]he females were
in an organized weightlifting program, Mr. Johnson was their
74. See id. at 1093.
75. Id. at 1097.
76. Id. at 1096-97.
77. Id. at 1096.
78. Johnson, F. Supp. 2d at 1097.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing United States v. Wallenfang, 568 F.3d 649, 660 (8th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that a minor was portrayed as a sexual object when the images were
primarily sexual in subject and were uploaded to a website devoted to sexual images)).
81. Id. at 1097.
82. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (2012)).
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coach, and it was undisputed that weighing in the nude was a
common practice with weight lifters.”83 Judge Dorr noted that
from the viewpoint of the minor females, they were not asked
to do anything unusual.84 Until the girls realized they had
been videotaped, they had no reason to be upset. 85 As a
result, the district court granted Mr. Johnson’s motion for
acquittal notwithstanding the jury’s verdict of guilty.86
4. The Eighth Circuit’s Focus on the Intent Over the
Content of the Videotapes
Upon review, a panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found Johnson guilty of
violating § 2251 in an opinion that deemphasized the videos’
contents and stressed the Defendant’s sexual intentions.87
Judge Hansen found the district court’s analysis to be
misplaced.88 First, the Eighth Circuit distinguished between
images constituting mere nudity and images rising to the
level of lasciviousness.89 Judge Hansen agreed that “[m]ore
than mere nudity is required before an image can qualify as
‘lascivious’ within the meaning of the statute [§ 2256].”90
However, he stressed that lascivious images provide more
than just a clinical view of the portions of a child’s anatomy. 91
Relying upon the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Knox to explain the concept of “mere nudity,” Judge Hansen
opined that surely “no one seriously could think that a Renoir
painting of a nude woman or an innocuous family snapshot of
a naked child in the bathtub violates the child pornography
laws.”92 However, lasciviousness may exist even when a
child’s genitals are only partially exposed.93
83. Id. at 1094.
84. Johnson, F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
85. Id. at 1094.
86. Id. at 1100.
87. See generally Johnson, 639 F.3d at 433.
88. Id. at 439.
89. See id. at 440.
90. Id. (quoting United States v. Kemmerling, 285 F.3d 644, 645-46 (8th Cir.
2002)).
91. Id. at 439 (citing Kemmerling, 285 F.3d at 646). In Kemmerling, the court
distinguished images depicting the genitalia of young males, which were labeled as
lascivious, from those that could be classified as depicting only mere nudity.
92. Id. (quoting United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 750 (3d Cir. 1994)).
93. Knox, 32 F.3d at 744.
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Using this distinction between mere nudity and
lasciviousness in his Dost Factor Test analysis of the videos,
Judge Hansen opined that the minors were portrayed as
sexual objects.94
First, Judge Hansen emphasized the
camera’s focus and zoom, stating that a reasonable jury could
find that Johnson had adjusted the zoom to tighten the focus
of the camera on the area where the females’ genitals would
have been had they been facing the lens, thereby fulfilling the
first Dost Factor (whether the focal point is on the minor’s
genitals or pubic area).95 In at least one video, the camera’s
focus had been so “zoomed in” that the left half of the female’s
body from her left buttock down to her knee filled half of the
screen.96 Had the female been facing the camera instead of
away from it, the camera would have filmed a close-up view of
her naked pubic area.97 Second, Judge Hansen opined that a
reasonable jury could have concluded that, because the videos
show the girls from their shoulders to their calves, including
naked breasts, the facial features of the girls were of little or
no importance to Johnson.98 Finally, Judge Hansen indicated
that “[s]ome of the clips [do] clearly reveal the pubic areas of
the young women not only as they stand on the scale facing
the camera, but also as they go through the motions required
to remove all of their clothing and put it back on.”99 Thus,
because of where the camera was focused, the images of the
girls could not reasonably be compared to innocent family
photos, clinical depictions or works of art.100
Judge Hansen then stated that to find a violation of §
2251, the lascivious act need not be committed by the child,
but by the alleged perpetrator.101 Demonstrating his point, he
applied the Fifth Dost Factor that asks whether sexual
coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity is
present.102 According to Judge Hansen, the minors depicted
in the videos were not acting in an obviously sexual manner,
failing to demonstrate any coyness or willingness to engage in
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Johnson, 639 F.3d at. 440.
Id.; United States v. Dost 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
Johnson, 639 F.3d at 436-37.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 440.
Johnson, 638 F.3d at 440.
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sexual activity.103 However, this does not necessarily indicate
that the videos were not lascivious.104 In Horn, the Eighth
Circuit held that ”lascivious exhibition need not necessarily
be ‘the work of the child, whose innocence is not in question,
but of the producer or editor of the video.’”105 Thus, even
images of children acting innocently (such as the girls in this
case) can be lascivious if they are intended to be sexual.106
Judge Hansen also noted that all six Dost Factors do not
need to be present for an image to be proscribed under §
2251.107
Therefore, even though three Dost Factors (a
sexually suggestive setting, inappropriate attire or unnatural
poses, and a suggestion of sexual coyness) were not present in
Mr. Johnson’s videos, a reasonable jury could still find that
Mr. Johnson acted lasciviously.108 For example, the fact that
the camera was specifically pointed at the scale,
encompassing the minors’ nude bodies from their shoulders to
below their knees, still weighed in favor of lasciviousness.109
Finally, the Eighth Circuit held that statements made by
the producer of the images must be considered in determining
whether the images were meant to elicit a sexual response in
the viewer.110 Judge Hansen considered that “[o]n at least one
occasion after a lifter had come out from the examination
room, he [Johnson] pointedly asked the young woman (age 1516) if she had stripped down completely.”111 Even more, when
investigators asked Johnson why he had filmed the two
minors he stated that “he thought they were ‘cute’ and that he
was curious about what they looked like naked.”112 Johnson
even admitted to police, “[M]y pervertedness got the best of
me.”113 Based on Johnson’s statements and his other analysis,
Judge Hansen held that a reasonable jury could find that
Johnson intended the videos to be sexual in nature and to

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
2009)).
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 790 (8th Cir. 1999)).
Id. at 439.
Id. at 440 (citing United States v. Wallenfang, 568 F.3d 649, 657 (8th Cir.
Johnson, 638 F.3d at 440.
Id. at 440-41.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 436.
Id.
Id.
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elicit a sexual response in the viewer.114 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals therefore reversed the district court’s
decision to grant Mr. Johnson’s motion for acquittal
notwithstanding the verdict.115
II. THE DOST FACTOR TEST: A VAGUE, MISAPPLIED FACTUAL
ANALYSIS THAT PROMOTES THE SEXUALIZATION OF CHILDREN
While the Dost Factor Test is widely implemented by
different circuits and supported by scholars, it has been
subject to extensive criticism for its vague terms, its
unintentional promotion of the sexualization of children, and
its misapplication among the courts.
A number of
commentators have supported the application of this test.
Former Chief Deputy Attorney General of the Nebraska
Attorney General’s Office Steven L. Grasz asserts that in
order “[t]o fully protect children from psychological and
emotional harm, states should enact legislation which
restricts the production, distribution, and possession of nude
visual depictions of children.”116 The Dost Factor Test,
according to Grasz, accomplishes this goal by providing one of
the clearest guides for federal courts to determine what types
of materials should be proscribed under the Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act.117 Likewise, James
E. Bristol opines that child pornography laws, including the
Dost Factor Test, rightfully proscribe the abhorrent
exploitation of children that originates from the production of
“kiddy-porn.” 118 To Bristol, this test helps to eradicate one of

114. Johnson, 638 F.3d at 441 (citing United States v. Kemmerling, 285 F.3d 644,
646 (8th Cir. 2002)). Images designed to elicit a sexual response from the viewer are
distinguishable from those designed to provide a clinical view of sections of a child’s
anatomy.
115. Id.
116. Grasz, supra note 30, at 634.
117. Id. at 623. This notion is illustrated by the number of cases that have followed
the court’s holding in Dost. See e.g. United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241, 244-46 (10th
Cir. 1989) (affirming the trial court’s use of Dost Factors in measuring the
lasciviousness of a photo of a partially nude girl); United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d
117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989) (adopting Dost Factors to determine whether photos of a nude
boy are lascivious genital exhibitions); United States v. Mr. A, 756 F. Supp. 326, 328-29
(E.D. Mich. 1991) (using Dost Factors to find that the genitalia of children were not
lasciviously exhibited in photos taken by their parents).
118. Bristol, supra note 1, at 348 (explaining that “kiddy porn” consists of motion
pictures depicting sex crimes perpetrated against real children).
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society’s worst crimes.119
However, several critics believe the Dost Factor Test uses
vague and confusing language, promotes the sexualization of
children, and focuses too heavily on either the content of or
the intent behind the images. Even Bristol acknowledges the
Dost Factor Test’s problems of visual interpretation, law
application and product accessibility, which allow motion
pictures with illegal depictions of children to enter the
marketplace unnoticed.120 Triers of fact who must apply this
test are often left wondering what exactly it is they are
supposed to interpret.121 With such an immense amount of
scrutiny, the Dost Factor Test must be reframed into a more
coherent structure for judges and jurors across the United
States.
A. Vagueness and Discrepancy in the Dost Factor Test
Scholars have criticized the United States’ child
pornography laws, including both 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 and §
2256 (specifically the term lascivious) and the Dost Factor
Test, due to their vagueness and resulting differences in
interpretation.
For instance, § 2256 defines child
pornography as “any visual depiction . . . of sexually explicit
conduct involving a minor.”122 However, Allison Cochran
explains that this language creates several gray areas for
legal interpretation. 123 Because this definition requires the
depicted minor to be engaged in sexual activity, Cochran asks
whether a minor just standing in a picture in her
underclothes or even naked can ever truly constitute sexual
explicitness.124 Unfortunately, § 2256 and Congress provide
no guidance as to how the courts should interpret its
language.
Critics also find § 2251 problematic, because the ambiguity
in defining the term lascivious under § 2256 results in the
inconsistent application of § 2251 against alleged offenders.
As Bristol explains, photographs of a nude, partially nude,
and even fully clothed child create quasi-legal scenarios,
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 355.
18 U.S.C. § 2256.
Cochran, supra note 4, at 4.
Id.
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where the deciding factor turns on whether the child’s body
was portrayed with lascivious intent.125 However, Bristol
raises the question as to what exactly the term lascivious
describes.126 To Bristol, the word lascivious could describe a
multitude of elements including the child, the child’s act, the
filmmaker’s intent, or even the viewer’s reaction.127
Even worse, the circuit courts’ inconsistent applications of
§ 2251 and the term lascivious provide little guidance for
applying this statute’s terms. For example, the Eighth
Circuit in United States v. Kemmerling held that a picture is
lascivious only when it is sexual in nature. 128 Thus, § 2251 is
violated when a picture depicts a child nude, partially clothed,
or when the focus of the image is the child’s pubic area. 129
However, distinguishing this definition, Bristol notes that in
New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court held that § 2251
prohibits lascivious images that “visually depict sexual
conduct by children[.]”130 Likewise, Adler notes that in United
States v. Knox, Solicitor General Drew Days made a similar
argument, claiming lascivious must mean that the child is
depicted as engaging in sexual conduct.131 However, the Third
Circuit disagreed with Days, holding that lascivious has
nothing to do with the actions of the child, but centers on
whether the photographs serve to satisfy the sexual cravings
of a voyeur.132 Bristol demonstrates that in applying § 2251
one is left to ponder whether lascivious should be limited to
describing the child (as held in Kemmerling), the conduct of
the child (as held in Ferber and argued by Days in Knox), or
the filmmaker’s intent.133
Such variances in defining
lasciviousness demonstrate the need for circuit courts to
adopt a more cohesive and reliable standard for proscribing
child pornography and prosecuting those who violate § 2251.
125. Bristol, supra note 1, at 351 (citing Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 583
(1983)).
126. Id. at 353-54.
127. Id. at 354.
128. 285 F.3d 644, 646 (8th Cir. 2002).
129. Id.
130. Bristol, supra note 1, at 354 (quoting New York v. Ferber, U.S. 747, 764
(1982)).
131. Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 954 (2001) (citing
Brief for the United States at 9, Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1995) (No. 921183)).
132. Id. (citing United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 747 (3d Cir. 1994)).
133. Bristol, supra note 1, at 354.
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Furthermore, the Dost Factor Test’s vague terms, coupled
with each trier of fact’s unique life experiences, make it nearly
impossible to create a uniform, fact-intensive test for
lascivious images. Bristol raises the question; can a depiction
be lascivious based upon the factors outlined in Dost? 134
Considering the different Dost Factor Test elements applied
by the courts, Bristol asks how elements such as “sexually
suggestive,” “sexual coyness,” and “designed to elicit sexual
response in the viewer” should be defined.135 According to
Anne Higonnet, this question cannot be answered, because
legal interpretations of these ambiguous terms slip and slide
in each direction during attempts to unravel their ultimate
meaning.136 Because such terms are open to multiple
interpretations, it is no wonder the Western District of
Missouri and the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Johnson
drew such different conclusions regarding the lasciviousness
of Johnson’s videos.
Finally, the application of the Dost Factor Test’s elements
may differ based upon a juror’s unique life experiences.
Bristol explains that while some laws enjoy clarity and
precision, interpreting images of children may never be
ascribed these attributes.137 Whether a filmmaker, the public
or a trier-of-fact, each individual will interpret from a sitz im
leben, or a situation in life.138 Characteristics including
cultural values, education, tolerance levels, politics, and even
religious beliefs will only complicate a person’s
interpretation.139 Thus, the vagueness of the Dost Factor
Test’s terms and each trier of fact’s unique interpretation of
such terms illustrate the need to adopt a more coherent test
to identify lascivious images.
B. The Dost Factor Test—A Sexualizer of Children
Some scholars find the Dost Factor Test ineffective
because it reinforces society’s captivation with the
sexualization of children. They argue that the sexualization of
children in society makes it difficult to determine an objective
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 354-55.
Id. at 355 (citing United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986)).
Higonnet, supra note 17, at 161.
Bristol, supra note 1, at 355.
Id.
Id.
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test that can differentiate between lascivious and nonlascivious content involving children. Anne Higonnet opines
that “eroticism in mainstream images of children . . . [and]
sexualization of childhood is not a fringe phenomenon
inflicted by perverts on a protesting society, but a
fundamental change furthered by legitimate industries and
millions of satisfied customers.”140 Children’s bodies advertise
a plethora of society’s products including swimsuits,
fragrances, clothing, electronics, and other commodities. 141
“Every industry based on the display of adult bodies spawns a
juvenile counterpart.”142 In fact, Bristol notes that the
clothing line Abercrombie began selling its catalogue because
the provocative photos of its teenage models were so
successful that the images became the commodity.143
In another example of sexualizing children, Bristol
describes how southern United States citizens are infatuated
with child beauty pageants.144 “Little girls—some as young as
three and four-years-old—are judged based solely upon
appearance of makeup, hairstyle, and outfit—either bathing
suit or evening gown.”145 This sexualization of children can
make interpreting the Dost Factor Test difficult, allowing
suspect depictions of children to go unnoticed and innocent
and valuable depictions to be censored.146
Furthermore, several critics claim the Dost Factor Test
itself contributes to the sexualization of children. According
to Adler, the Dost Factor Test requires one to “evaluate the
lasciviousness of the photographer and an ‘audience that
consists of himself or like-minded pedophiles.’”147 Both Alder
and Danay emphasize that the trier of fact must focus on the
photographer’s peculiar lust and take on the gaze of the
pedophile in order to flush out pictures of children that have
pedophilic appeal. 148 To Adler, this requirement under the
140. Higonnet, supra note 17, at 153.
141. Id. at 144.
142. Id.
143. Bristol, supra note 1, at 364.
144. Id. at 365 (citing C. Calvert, The Perplexing Problem of Child Modeling Web
Sites: Quasi-Child Pornography and Calls for New Legislation, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 231
(2004)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 356.
147. Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 954 (quoting United
States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1987)).
148. Id. at 954; Danay, supra note 18, at 154.
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Dost Factor Test creates the daunting task for a layperson to
ascertain a pedophile’s exact intent. The difficulty and
grotesqueness in such instructions were most evident in
Foster v. Virginia, in which the Virginia Court of Appeals
urged the jury to ascertain the intent of a man accused of
committing necrophilia against children.149
Likewise, Danay illustrates how the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Knox used its own pedophilic gaze
to find that an image constituted the “lascivious exhibition of
the genitals” despite the fact that the child was wearing
attire.150 The Dost Factor Test required the Third Circuit to
“carefully, explicitly, and publicly scrutinize the genital and
pubic regions of clothed minors” in an effort to detect a
picture’s sexually stimulating nature.151 To Danay, this test
wrongfully places a “sexual child on public display while
simultaneously condemning those who view children in such a
manner.”152 Through cases such as Knox and Dost, Danay
asserts that the American courts have become “unwitting
cultural conduits and amplifiers,” to the portrayal of children
as sexual objects.153 Such a flawed process for extinguishing
child pornography inadvertently contributes in part to
society’s inability to fully eliminate the problem.154
C. The Dost Factor Test: All Image and No Intent or All Intent
and No Image?
Critics also assert that courts applying the Dost Factor
Test rely too heavily on either the content of an image or the
intent behind an image in deciding whether § 2251 has been
violated. On one hand, many critics claim judges and/or
juries that rely too heavily upon content-based Dost Factor
Test elements in their analysis fail to consider the pedophile
who fulfills his perverse intentions with innocuous images of
minors. For example, Adler explains how the Third Circuit
149. Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 955 (citing Foster v.
Virginia, No. 0369-87-2, 1989 WL 641956, at 4 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1989)).
150. Danay, supra note 18, at 155 (citing United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 744
(3d Cir. 1994)).
151. Id. at 155-56.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 156.
154. Id. at 168 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME 1
AN INTRODUCTION 264 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books, 1990 ed.) (1978)).
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Court of Appeals misapplied the Dost Factor Test in United
State v. Villard by holding that child pornography inheres in
a photograph. 155 Similarly, the First Circuit in United States
v. Amirault ruled it is unacceptable for the court to analyze
beyond the four corners of a photograph, otherwise “a
deviant’s subjective response could turn innocuous images
into pornography.”156 However, this approach is problematic.
As Danay explains, the sexual naïveté of a depicted child
could be the arousing factor for pedophiles (emphasis
added).157 For example, Danay indicates that a recent survey
regarding members of the North American Man Boy Love
Association (NAMBLA), an organization for pedophiles,
revealed that its members derived erotic stimulation through
watching the Disney Channel, mainstream films, and other
networks that televise children.158 Hence, limiting a Dost
Factor Test analysis to the four corners of an image restricts
the prohibitive capabilities of § 2251 to an overly-narrow
category of images.
On the other hand, there are scholars who claim that
triers of fact who focus too heavily on the intent-based
elements of the Dost Factor Test wrongfully disregard the
content of an image. Bristol and Adler raise concerns that an
intent-based application of the Dost Factor fails to consider
society’s numbness to childhood sexuality and problematically
encourages jurors to only consider the perspective of the
alleged pedophile. For example, Bristol notes that “as society
continues to recognize expressive value in depictions of
childhood sexuality, the more acceptable such expression
becomes.”159 In fact, nude portrayals of children date back to
the classics age, where children were depicted in Greek
statues and Renaissance paintings.160 According to Bristol,
“[p]eople may not be bothered [by the content of such images]
because they have been fascinated by similar content for
centuries.”161
Even more, as Adler explains, several courts enforcing
155. Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 957-58 (citing United
States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989)).
156. Id. at 958 (citing United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1999)).
157. Danay, supra note 18, at 157.
158. Id.
159. Bristol, supra note 1, at 358.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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child pornography laws have tended to approach the issue
through the perspective of the pedophile. This can be
problematic, as pedophiles may be stimulated by images of
nude children that have absolutely no sexual connotation.162
For example, Bristol notes that in United States v. Moore, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed photographs of
two young boys naked in the Australian wilderness.163 One
photograph depicted a boy walking across a stream, while the
other showed a boy climbing a tree.164 Although the court
found that neither photo “appear[ed] to depict sexual activity
or sexuality,” the court still concluded that the pictures
seemed “designed to provoke a sexual response.”165 Likewise,
Adler notes the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeal’s
decision in State v. Dixon, in which the defendant secretly
filmed two young girls bathing.166 While the court recognized
that the contents of the tape consisted of innocent and
everyday activity, the defendant watched the tape before
engaging in sexual relations with his adult girlfriend.167
Therefore, in spite of the harmlessness of the images on the
videotape, the defendant’s repugnant intent led the court to
classify the contents of the videotape as child pornography. 168
As Adler asserts, when viewed from the perspective of
pedophiles, all photos of children could be erotic in one way or
another.169 Because the Dost Factor Test permits focusing
exclusively on the intent behind the images in question, this
application may proscribe images that would not be
considered lascivious had their content also been examined.
D. Suggestions from Scholars to Reform the Current Child
Pornography Laws:
While scholars have proposed a harm analysis test and an
incitement test to reform America’s child pornography laws,
each proposed remedy is an unrealistic “fix” for the law’s
162. Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 959.
163. Bristol, supra note 1, at 360 (citing United States v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 687
(7th Cir. 2000)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 959 (citing State v.
Dixon, 01C01-9802-CC-00085, 1998 WL 712344 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1998)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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deficiencies. Under the first suggested reform, the harm
analysis test, Bruce Ryder recommends prohibiting the
possession of materials containing images of children if the
images caused “harm” to children in their production. 170
Commenting on Ryder’s recommended reform, Danay notes
that under this approach, child pornography should be limited
to materials where children engage in “explicit sex acts.”171
To Danay, Ryder’s proposed harm analysis test would refocus
judicial attention on the express advocacy of harm, sexual or
otherwise, to children, and not on the hidden prurient
qualities inherent in particular impugned materials.172
Proponents of this reform also assert that it would remind
courts that child pornography laws are designed to prevent
actual harm to children, not to conduct an analysis that may
hazily send the message that sex with children may be
pursued. 173
However, critics of the harm analysis test, such as James
Marsh, former executive director of the Children’s Law Center
in Washington, D.C., stress that this reform disregards the
concept that child pornography, in and of itself, causes
personal injury to the child involved.174 For example, the
Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber noted that “a child who
has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the
recording is circulating within the mass distribution system
for child pornography.”175 According to the Supreme Court,
the fear of exposure and the tension of keeping the images
secret have profound emotional repercussions upon
children.176 Moreover, Professor Debra Burke states that
there is substantial social evidence that persons who molest
minors use such images as a tool, not only to arouse predatory
lust, but also to seduce children.177 Under Ryder’s proposed
test, pedophiles would be allowed to keep for their own
170. Bruce Ryder, The Harms of Child Pornography Law, 36 U. OF B.C. L. REV. 101,
114 (2003).
171. Danay, supra note 18, at 186 (commenting on Ryder’s proposed harm analysis
test).
172. Id. at 187 (commenting on Ryder’s proposed harm analysis test).
173. Id. at 187-88.
174. James R. Marsh, Masha’s Law: A Federal Civil Remedy for Child Pornography
Victims, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 459, 495 (2011).
175. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
176. Id.
177. Debra D. Burke, Thinking Outside The Box: Child Pornography, Obscenity,
and the Constitution, VA. J. L. & TECH. ¶ 58 (2003).
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perversions images that fall short of causing what Ryder
defines as “harm” to the child being exploited.
In United States v. Johnson, the concerns expressed by
Marsh and Burke would have come to fruition had a harm
analysis test been applied. Several times, Johnson told
female athletes to go into an examination room, completely
disrobe and weigh themselves.178 However, the females
remained completely unaware that Johnson had set up a
hidden video camera to film their weigh-ins. 179 In fact,
Johnson hid the camera between two shelves, ensuring
adequate cover.180 Under the proposed harm analysis test
suggested by Ryder, the videos Johnson filmed would not
meet the harm analysis test. This is because no actual harm
was caused to the minors and they were not forced to engage
in explicit sexual acts. Still, such a test ignores the principle
that child pornography is inherently harmful to the child that
it portrays.
This test does not consider the potential
psychological harm to children, such as those in Johnson,
which may result once the children have learned of the
exploitive act committed against them. As a result, Johnson
would be free to retain, and even disseminate, the videos he
created of the minors, despite the fact that he confessed to
creating them with perverse intentions.181
Under the second suggested reform, the incitement test,
Burke calls for courts to evaluate the context of an image in
order to determine if an incitement to imminent lawless
activity exists (as was employed by the Supreme Court in
Brandenberg v. Ohio182 in the First Amendment context). 183
Explaining the proposed incitement test, Burke states that,
“while it is unlikely that a mother who shows a picture taken
of her child in the bathtub to a sister would be held
accountable, a commercial provider of sexually explicit speech
to a foreseeable pedophilic audience likely would be held
accountable,” due to its prospect of inciting imminent
lawlessness.184 However, even Burke is quick to explain that
178. United States v. Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1091 (W.D. Mo. 2010).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1092.
181. See United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2011).
182. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that the United States Constitution does not
protect speech that serves to incite imminent lawless action).
183. Burke, supra note 177, at ¶ 56.
184. Id.
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this approach does not fix all of the child pornography law
issues.185 According to Burke, under the incitement test,
“there is still no controlling for pedophiles who are aroused by
the photos of children clad in underwear in clothing
catalogues.”186
Illustrating Burke’s concern for the proposed incitement
test’s inability to proscribe innocuous images of children, the
images in Johnson would not have been prohibited under
such a test. Much like an inoffensive catalogue portraying
children in their underwear, the sport of weightlifting
requires that coaches document a lifter’s weight through
frequent weigh-ins for competitive events.187 Prior to a
competition, each participant stands on a scale and “weighs
in” in either the nude or in underwear.188 In addition, a
referee of the same gender conducts the weigh-in.189 Under an
incitement test, the fact that Johnson was drawn to images of
such inoffensive and routine procedures in the sport of
weightlifting would most likely render his conduct and the
images he created legal. Likewise, the images of each minor
in Johnson could hardly be found to incite imminent lawless
activity. The first count described that the video did not show
the minor’s pubic region, but instead only portrayed the minor
from just below her shoulders to her calves.190 Under the
second count, no frontal nudity was evident. 191 Likewise, the
third count only showed the minor from her left buttock to
just below her knee.192 Finally, even under the fifth count, the
video failed to show any nudity, depicting only a female in red
workout shorts.193 Based upon these facts, the proposed
incitement test would provide no protection for minors who
were subjected to Johnson’s abuse of recording routine
weightlifting procedures.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at ¶ 62.
Johnson, 639 F. 3d. at 436.
Id.
Id.
Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1093.
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III. BRINGING A TRUE BALANCE OF CONTEXT AND CONTEXT TO
THE DOST FACTOR TEST
A. The Misapplication of the Dost Factor Test in United States
v. Johnson
The conflicting decisions by the Western District Court of
Missouri and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Johnson demonstrate that the Dost Factor Test is
ineffective in proscribing lascivious images of children. Judge
Dorr of the district court chose to focus his entire analysis on
the content of the images in question, thus overturning the
jury’s conviction of Johnson on all eight violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251.194 However, Judge Hansen of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals explained that, while hardly any of the
videos of the victims filmed a child’s pubic region, such
images would have been captured had each child merely
turned to face the camera.195 Based on the camera’s angle and
admissions of Johnson, Judge Hansen opined that the
Defendant’s sexual intent made the images lascivious, even if
the images were unable to meet certain content-based
factors.196 To prevent such discrepancies from arising in the
future, the elements of the Dost Factor Test should be applied
on an equal basis, where triers of fact are mandated to apply
a balance of content-based and intent-based factors in their
analysis as to whether an image constitutes lasciviousness.
B. In Determining Lasciviousness, the Reformed Dost Factor
Test Will Assess Both the Content of an Image and the
Intent Behind Its Creation
A novel suggestion to create a sense of uniformity in
implementing the Dost Factor Test is to require that a
mandatory balance of both content-based and intent-based
Dost Factors be present in order to proscribe an image under
§2251. This new reading of the current Dost Factor Test will
tend to insulate the Dost Factor Test analysis from the
emotions of jurors and judges, who wish to apply only those
factors that suit their predispositions. In addition, the new
194.
195.
196.

See generally id. at 1089.
Johnson, 639 F.3d at 436-37.
Id. at 439-40.
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Dost Factor Test will remain organic as technology and child
pornography change over time. Finally, it will allow courts to
form distinct categories of images that are lascivious under
society’s standards, and therefore proscribe them under §
2251.
First, the new Dost Factor Test will insulate the
application of the law from the high emotions that often
accompany child pornography cases. By requiring that a
balance of both content-based and intent-based factors be
present in a Dost Factor Test analysis for an image to be
lascivious, triers of fact will be restricted from applying only
those factors that suit their predispositions toward the
defendant. Had this approach been used in United States v.
Johnson, the Eighth Circuit would have been required to
show not only that Mr. Johnson had a sexual intent (based
upon the camera’s angle and testimony), but also that the
image contained proscribed content (based on the images
depicted in the videos). Even though these new requirements
create a higher standard for prosecutors to meet, the newly
proposed rule offers an extra level of assurance that the
images were properly proscribed or accepted.
Second, these new requirements for both content-based
and intent-based factors can fluctuate in meaning based upon
society’s standards of decency toward children.
Today,
children are openly accepted as models in clothing lines and
even arguably as sex symbols in the music and entertainment
industry. These are common occurrences that only a few
decades ago were considered inappropriate. For such reasons,
it would be nearly impossible to reform the Dost Factor Test
to contain completely objective factors with timeless
interpretations. Instead, implementing this new requirement
will still allow the application of different Dost Factors to
mold to society’s norms as time progresses. For example, if
the Dost Factor Test is applied to analyze the potential
lasciviousness of an image, the content-based factors of
“sexual coyness” or “sexually suggestiveness” may be selected
by the judge to create a balance with the intent-based factors
he or she also selects. Critically though, the definition of
what constitutes “sexual coyness” or “sexual suggestiveness”
would be allowed to change as America’s culture evolves. The
new Dost Factor Test will never be outdated to assess
potentially lascivious images. In addition, the new Dost
Factor Test’s adaptability will allow it to be applicable to new
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technology, such as virtual child pornography. Furthermore,
the current Dost Factor Test is non-exhaustive, allowing
judges to add and eliminate factors in their analysis as they
deem necessary.197 This principle would remain intact under
the new Dost Factor Test. Nevertheless, under the new rule,
there must always remain a balance between factors
analyzing the content and factors analyzing the intent behind
an image.
Finally, these new requirements for the Dost Factor Test
will gradually establish defined categories of lascivious
images. The freedom that courts are given in selecting which
Dost Factor to apply have led to inconsistent rulings, as seen
in United States v. Johnson. Such decisions keep the public
from understanding the meaning of lasciviousness and thus,
understanding what types of images constitute sexually
explicit conduct under § 2251. However, with the court’s
consistent implementation of a set of both content-based and
intent-based factors, patterns of lascivious images will
develop over time. These patterns allow the public to
understand what sorts of images cross the threshold into the
territory of child pornography, even before the images are
created. Now, photographers and videographers will have a
better understanding as to whether their proposed images
will likely be considered a violation of § 2251. Even more,
such knowledge will turn the Dost Factor Test into a
preventative measure against the sexual exploitation of
children, rather than simply a retroactive test to assess the
harm that has already damaged a child.
IV. CONCLUSION
This new standard for the Dost Test, while perhaps more
rigid than its current standard, will still allow for great
flexibly as societal and cultural norms change over time. In
addition, a more rigid test will help to establish a uniform
definition of the term lascivious during the time period in
which the Dost Factor Test is applied. Finally, these reforms
will serve, to not only enhance the protection of children, but
also to prevent the convictions of those who are, in fact,
innocent of any violation under § 2251.
197. Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (citing United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp.
828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986)).

